LOUX METAPHYSICS PDF
In this fully revised and updated version of the highly successful first edition, Michael J. Loux provides a fresh look at the central topics in metaphysics rendering. _Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction_ is aimed at students of metaphysics who have already completed an introductory philosophy course. This third. Metaphysics: A contemporary introduction is for students who have already done an introductory philosophy course. Michael J. Loux provides a.
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Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction
Thanks for telling us about the problem. Return to Book Page. Preview — Metaphysics by Michael J. A Contemporary Introduction is aimed at students of metaphysics who have already mehaphysics an introductory philosophy course. This third edition of the successful textbook provides a fresh look at key topics in metaphysics and includes two new chapters on time and causation.
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metaphysisc Wherever possible, Loux links contemporary views to their classical sources in the hist Metaphysics: Wherever possible, Loux links contemporary views to their classical sources in the history of philosophy. This new edition also keeps the user-friendly format, the chapter overviews summarizing the main topics and examples to clarify difficult concepts.
Paperbackpages. Published July 7th by Routledge first published November 13th Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy. To see what your friends thought of this book, please sign up. To ask other readers questions about Metaphysicsplease sign up. Lists with This Book. This book is not yet featured on Loud.
Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction – Michael J. Loux – Google Books
Jan 14, Paul rated it it was amazing Shelves: This is an excellent, albeit not easy, introduction to metaphysics. Loux approaches this subject in Aristotelian fashion. That is, the sudy of being qua being. This is opposed to Kantian metaphysics which has the characterization of our conceptual scheme as its aim.
He discusses such topics as the This is an excellent, albeit metaphyics easy, introduction to metaphysics. Good philosophy, and good teaching on metaphysics is not easy, but this book is still introductory. The metaphysical novice can work through this book I did and reap the rewards it offers.
The discussions on universals, propositions, and possible world modalities are excellent. The reader will gain a working vocabulary and a base from which future study in metaphysics will be greatly aided. Loux is a top-rate metaphysician.
Whether you agree with all of his conclusions mmetaphysics not, this Notre Dame prof will provide you with a great introduction to this important philosophic topic. He has his settled conclusions, but is vary fair with opposing positions.
Nov 14, Jacob Aitken rated it it was amazing Shelves: Loux gives a thorough, intermediate “introduction” to the current problems in contemporary metaphysics. He llux defends an Aristotelian metaphysics of sorts, though he is fair to different conclusions.
He gives the standard surveys of Realism and Nominalism, though he does focus on modern nominalist defenders with a discussion on trope nominalism. He has two different sections on “Particular Loux gives a thorough, intermediate “introduction” to the current problems in contemporary metaphysics. He has two different sections metaphydics “Particulars” and notes the difficulties each position will face.
I am surprised he did not discuss the Ship of Theseus problem.
I particularly enjoyed his fine chapter on Possible Worlds Semantics. It is here that he drew together a number of themes: Those who hold to realism also hold to identity through time and usually Possible Worlds Actualism. Nominalists as a general rule do not with exceptions. This is a fine account of modern metaphysics, though certainly not for the beginning reader.
Apr 30, Richard Newton rated it really liked it Shelves: I found this to be a good metaphysics introduction at the undergraduate level, but only for a limited number of topics. One or two of the topics I metapyysics read reasonably extensively on, but still found something new in Loux’s book, or found his explanations particularly clear.
The chapters on universals and concrete particulars are particularly good. I also liked his final chapter on realism versus anti realism.
On the downside I found the writing style occasionally a little irritating, mainly beca I found this to be a good metaphysics introduction at the undergraduate level, but only for a limited number of topics.
On the downside I found the writing style occasionally a little irritating, mainly because he over-explains some items. However, this is a lesser sin than assuming the reader understands and jumping around without sufficient explanation.
The chapter on causality, which is a subject I am interested in, is thin. There is nothing on freedom and determinism or the mind-body issue. Perhaps these are not contemporary. I found another book on metaphysics by Lowe’s to suffer from similar problems, but overall to be a little more rounded and more enjoyable to read.
Actually read this over the course of about two years, selecting chapters I was most interested in — the one on modality and the one on persistence — first.
He does drill into rival views, though I’m more surprised by what he doesn’t discuss. Perhaps things like exdurance not discussed can be chalked up to being more advanced topics.
Also, he raises the idea of supervenience in one chapter, but not in others. I’d expect it to come up especially in a discussion of proposi Actually read this over the course of about two years, selecting chapters I was most interested in — the one on modality and the one on persistence — first.
I’d expect it to come up especially in a discussion of propositions.
By the way, this mini-review is for the edition. I know he expanded the book in a revised edition, but have yet to read that one. Jul 23, Jens rated it really liked it Shelves: This book gives a good introduction to contemporary neo-Aristotelean metaphysics as it is practiced in analytic departments.
It discusses the classic but still unresolved problem of universals, providing a detailed overview of realism and nominalism, two camps that continue to return in later sections. As is the case when talking about substrata, where substance and bundle theorists diverge along the same lines.
Characteristic of analytic philosophy is its linguistic turn which here follows a st This book gives a good introduction to contemporary neo-Aristotelean metaphysics as it is practiced in analytic departments. Characteristic of analytic philosophy is its linguistic turn which here follows a strong correspondence theory of truth that comes out when discussing propositions, facts, events, and states-of-affairs and their ontological status. This part irked me because I think one cannot be more off the mark than this when it comes to language.
Modality, causation and time receive extended mwtaphysics as well, discussing the usual suspects: There is a chapter on persistence through time of particulars and the book finishes with some anti-realist challenges.
What I found most interesting though was the introduction. Here a justification is given as to why exactly we should go back to Aristotle in thinking about metaphysics metaphysivs the study of being qua being. The assumption is made that we have only our prephilosophical conception of the world, our intuitions, to rely on to decide what is good metaphysics and what is not.
If the consequences of some theory are exposed as absurd through thought experiments, the collective community’s response will be to turn away from it, and that pretty metaaphysics establishes its falsity.
I have no great quarrel with this, because it is exactly true that there is nothing else on which to trust in these things, but it does not sound like a great method. The job of metaphysics then consists in identifying the ontological categories under which all things fall such as particulars, propositions, thoughts, events, time, etc.
The main opponents to this way of philosophizing, and to which the author feels obliged to respond to, are the ‘conceptual schemers’. These are followers of the Kantian project of critique and argue for a restriction of reason to empirical claims only.
They do this by pointing out that experience is constituted by our conceptual scheme or framework, that what our experience provides is a specifically human point of view of reality that is ordered by the application of general concepts regulated by certain principles that are applied to unstructured sense-experience e.
The author’s counter argument makes use of an apparent infinite regress in this way of thinking: If we cannot get to know the real world because of the mediation of cognition, how come we can know whether or not there is any mediation to begin with? There would have to be a conceptual scheme that allows us to think this mediation, and then another one to think this second mediation, ad infinitum. I very much doubt this argument works. It depends on how expansive you take the definition of a ‘conceptual scheme’ to be.
Does this include logic? Then yes, it is unsound, in arguing for conceptual schemes one would be using a prior conceptual scheme. But if general principles of reasoning are presupposed to be universally valid as all philosophy necessarily does, otherwise there is no possibility of doing it and extraneous to the scheme, I think one can reason one’s way to this transcendentalist view; Kant’s treatment of causation being a good example of this: We never actually see causation happening, but we are convinced of it all the same.
I would go even farther and venture to say the neo-Aristotelian counter argument itself is faulty. It assumes the validity of the very inclusive conceptual scheme in order to show it leads to an infinite regress, but at the same time it relies on the neo-Aristotelian intuition about the absurdity of such a regress, an intuition the schemers hold we cannot trust. An infinite regress does not involve a straight contradiction, so can we really say the very inclusive conceptual scheme is a logically inconsistent idea?
Anyways, I’m more of a process metaphysics guy to begin with so I don’t really have a big bone in this fight. I wrote a little review of process metaphysics here. Jul 21, Rachael rated it it was amazing. I loved this introduction to metaphysics and ended up taking detailed notes.